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I. INTRODUCTION
After parking his car in the driveway, Brandon, a professional foot-
ball player, turned to ensure he saw the signature hazard light flash when
he pressed the “lock” button, indicating his car was locked. As he turned
to walk inside, he felt a sharp pain shoot down his hamstring and
thought to himself, “Man, my leg hurts. I hope it won’t keep me out of
the game again next week.” Once inside, Brandon found himself think-
ing about the day’s game. It had been a good game, with his team win-
ning 23-7, even though he had been unable to play because of his leg
pain. Hoping to take his mind off of the game and his pain, he settled
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down on the couch to watch TV. Instinctively, Brandon pulled out his
iPhone from his pocket and swiped through his apps. He pressed his
thumb on the Twitter app, hoping to find that one of his friends had
posted an interesting link to an article or a funny meme.1 Instead, he
found a slew of notifications—notifications from people he did not
know, threatening his life over his unachieved football statistics.
After missing a game because of a hamstring injury, Brandon
Jacobs, running back for the New York Giants, found himself in this
situation,2 resembling countless other professional athletes’ expe-
riences.3 In Jacobs’ case, a fan sent out a tweet stating that if Jacobs did
not “rush for 50 yards and 2 touchdowns,” both Jacobs’ and his family’s
lives would be in danger.4 Mere minutes after sending the first message,
the user sent a second tweet, reaffirming that he meant what he said,
declaring “thats [sic] yo life bruh and im [sic] not playing.”5 Jacobs
decided to show his followers what professional football players deal
with and shared a screenshot of the tweets he had received.6 Soon after,
the author of the tweets profusely apologized.7 Other professional foot-
ball players have echoed that these incidents happen repeatedly.8 How-
ever, unlike Jacobs, most players brush the threats aside, believing the
statements to be meaningless and therefore not worth more than a cur-
sory glance.9 As another professional athlete, Nate Burleson wide
receiver for the Detroit Lions explained, “‘[social media users are] using
1. A meme is a picture or image that projects a message, often through superimposed text.
These pictures are often funny and frequently go “viral,” meaning that they are rapidly shared by
Internet users, typically on social media.
2. The details as to where Jacobs was when he received the tweet are fictional and were
created by the author as an illustration.
3. See Dan Hanzus, Brandon Jacobs Received Death Threat on Twitter, NFL (Oct. 23,
2013), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000268235/article/brandon-jacobs-received-death-
threat-on-Twitter [hereinafter Death Threat]. Similarly, in December 2013, Matthew Stafford and
his teammate, Calvin Johnson, received a tweet asserting that a fan had lost his fantasy football
game by four points, and as a result he would shoot “four bullets for each [Calvin and Matthew].”
See Ashley Dunkak, Crazed Fantasy Football Fans Threaten Violence, ‘Four Bullets for Each of
You Bit****,’ CBS DETROIT (Dec. 19, 2013), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/12/19/crazed-
fantasy-football-fans-threaten-violence-scare-players-off-social-media/ [hereinafter Crazed
Football Fans]. The Twitter user’s threats continued to escalate in subsequent tweets, with one
tweet declaring “you should die if you can’t catch and your [sic] a receiver.” Id.
4. See Death Threat, supra note 3. R
5. Id.
6. See id. Jacobs shared the tweets with other fans on his Twitter page to raise awareness of
the threats athletes regularly receive. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Crazed Football Fans, supra note 3 (“The volume of hateful tweets is such that one R
does not have to look far to see individuals hurling expletives, encouraging a player to kill himself
or even threatening a player . . . .”).
9. See id.
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a screen as a buffer between them and the real world.’”10
Similarly, a British journalist received a bomb threat on her Twitter
account from an anonymous user, with whom she had never had any
previous communication, cautioning, “a bomb has been placed outside
your home. It will go off at exactly 10:47 PM on a timer and trigger
destroying everything.”11 Unlike the aforementioned athletes, the British
journalist felt obligated to report the threat and alerted authorities.12 No
bomb was found, but the police used countless resources to ensure the
journalist’s safety.13 Like the athletes, the British journalist turned to the
Internet with the information, asking her readers if she was right to have
reported the threat, a threat she had actually believed lacked
credibility.14
The British journalist described the threat as “cartoonish” to both
the police, and later, her readers.15 In her article, she reflected that she
never took the bomb threat seriously.16 So, if she did not feel threatened,
should the tweet that she called the police about be considered a true
threat under the law? What about the tweets sent to the football players?
While many who receive threats on the Internet may disregard them as
meaningless, our legal system often does not. As such, the difference
between how individuals respond to threats and the way the law penal-
izes threats represents a pronounced tension between our current free
speech jurisprudence and the statutes governing true threats.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment17 represents the
fundamental belief, espoused by our Founding Fathers, of a “profound
national commitment . . . that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide open.”18 The Supreme Court has declined to
extend protection, however, to speech that is “of such a slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit . . . is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.”19 Specifically, the Supreme Court
permits restrictions on certain categories of speech including obscenity,
fighting words, and true threats.20 Accordingly, an individual’s right to
10. Id.
11. Catherine Mayer, I Got a Bomb Threat on Twitter. Was I Right to Report It?, TIME (Aug.
2, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/08/02/i-got-a-bomb-threat-on-Twitter-was-i-right-to-report-






17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
19. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
20. See id. (holding that the Supreme Court has longstanding precedent that “discrete
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free speech is expansive but not absolute.21 Nevertheless, while broad
categories of speech may be limited, the actual limits on speech cur-
rently permitted by the Supreme Court are minimal—allowing for broad
protection of even valueless speech that may be outside the normal
social bounds of good taste.22
As a result, “in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insult-
ing, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing
space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”23 In conse-
quence, despite the fact that a tweet may be tasteless, or lack any socie-
tal value, these qualities alone do not provide a sufficient basis for
proscription.24 Instead, the presumption is in favor of protection unless
the speech specifically falls into an unprotected class of speech.25
As even speech of the lowest societal value is broadly protected,
the need for a clear true threat standard is even more pressing.26 Scholars
note that true threat cases are becoming more prevalent in light of the
expansion of ubiquitous access to the Internet and social media, because
it is easier than ever before to disseminate information to large groups of
people quickly, inexpensively, and for an extended or possibly indefinite
period of time.27 Moreover, courts have not addressed many of the free
speech implications of widespread access to the Internet and social
categories of expression [are] proscribable on the basis of their content,” including child
pornography; obscenity; time, place, and manner speech; and some but not all false statements).
21. See generally Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (explaining that “it is well understood that
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances[, and that t]here are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”).
22. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2010) (“The First Amendment itself
reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the
basis that some speech is not worth it.”). The Court in Stevens went on to state that the Supreme
Court does not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope
of the First Amendment.” Id. at 472; see, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48
(1988) (protecting satirical speech in Hustler magazine that portrayed Reverend Jerry Falwell’s
first sexual experience as “a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse”).
23. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at
56) (internal quotations omitted).
24. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 n.4 (D.D.C. 2012)
(citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 48) (“[I]t goes without saying that the First
Amendment applies to even the most tasteless of speech.”).
25. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
26. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56 (holding that a cartoon crassly depicting a fictional
account of Jerry Falwell’s first sexual encounter was protected).
27. Eric J. Segall, The First Amendment, the Internet, and the Criminal Law, The Internet as
a Game Changer: Reevaluating the True Threats Doctrine, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 183, 184 (2011)
(explaining that “the Internet is a game changer when it comes to criminal law and free speech
[because of the author’s] belief that there is simply no pre-Internet analogy that allows speech to
be disseminated so quickly, so cheaply, and to so many for such a long period of time”).
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media.28 Social media threats are not isolated to the professional football
community or journalism communities.29 New threats appear daily on
Twitter, sometimes to celebrities, but other times the tweets are directed
at average people—with less celebrity power to shame the speaker into
apologizing.30
Consequently, there is a pressing need for First Amendment juris-
prudence to guide online speech as the Internet allows people to quickly,
easily, and inexpensively reach a considerable number of people anony-
mously without regard to geographic location.31 This note focuses spe-
cifically on the need for a clear rule on the requisite level of intent
required for speech to rise to the level of a true threat and therefore fall
into the category of unprotected speech.32 While dictionaries define a
28. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (finding no precedent for the
requisite level of scrutiny for analyzing Internet free speech issues).
29. A man, who sent over 8,000 mean-spirited tweets to a woman, including statements
encouraging her to kill herself, was protected by the First Amendment when a court found that his
tweets did not rise to the level of “true threats.” See Todd Wasserman, Judge Rejects Twitter
Cyberstalking Case, CNN (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/16/tech/web/stalking-
on-Twitter-protected/.
30. See id.; see also United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding a man’s
Facebook post about his ex-wife to be a true threat), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
Another example is that of the University of Alabama kicker who received death threats
encouraging him to “drink bleach” or threating to kill him and his family after he missed critical
field goals in a school rivalry game. See Alabama Kicker Gets Death Threats on Twitter
Following Loss, CBS NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/alabama-kicker-gets-
death-threates-on-Twitter-following-loss/. Aside from athletes, politicians have also been
threatened via Twitter; for example, politician Ted Cruz attempted to negotiate a deal during the
government shutdown of October 2013 and, in return, received Twitter death threats. See
Margaret Chadbourn, Police and FBI Probe Twitter Threat Against U.S. Senator Cruz, REUTERS
(Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/20/us-usa-cruz-twitter-idUSBRE99J09
N20131020. In another case, Selena Gomez received death threats based on her relationship with
the popular teen icon Justin Bieber after pictures of the two in a loving embrace were released,
exposing their relationship. See Jessica Derschowitz, Selena Gomez Receives Death Threats over
Justin Bieber Photos, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/selena-gomez-
receives-death-threats-over-justin-bieber-photos/. Anna Gunn, a popular actress on the show
“Breaking Bad” received countless threats on Twitter and Facebook based on fans hatred of the
character she played on the show, not on her actual actions or personality. See Anna Gunn,
Editorial, I Have a Character Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 24, 2013, at A21, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/opinion/i-have-a-character-issue.html. Finally, the list would not
be complete without mention of at least one of the many Twitter death threats the President of the
United States, Barack Obama, has received: “the secret service is gonna [sic] be defenseless once I
aim the assault rifle at Baracks forehead,” tweeted a 21 year old who was later arrested for his
tweets. See Carol Cratty, North Carolina Man Accused of Twitter Threats to Kill Obama, CNN
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/06/justice/obama-threat-arrest.
31. See Segall, supra note 27, at 185; Bomb Threat, supra note 11; see also Petition for a Writ R
of Certiorari at 8, Jeffries v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 59 (2013) (No. 12-1185) [hereinafter Jeffries
Petition for Certiorari].
32. This note focuses on whether a speaker must have some subjective intent to threaten for a
statement to constitute a true threat. The note will not focus on the standard for the speaker’s
intent to communicate. Currently, Virginia v. Black, the most recent case to define true threats,
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA304.txt unknown Seq: 6 27-AUG-15 11:34
866 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:861
threat as “an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or dam-
age,” courts have been unable to settle on what this “expression of an
intention” is.33 This note will emphasize the need for clarity in this area
of free speech in light of the ease of communicating, and therefore
threatening, over the Internet, specifically in the context of true threats.34
Furthermore, this note will assess the current strengths and weaknesses
in the existing tests and will advocate for the test that appears to be best
suited for digital communication.
In assessing true threat jurisprudence, Part II of this note addresses
the backdrop for the underlying elements creating a tension in true threat
jurisprudence. This Section includes an overview of both the existing
social media landscape and Supreme Court precedent leading up to the
most recent decision on true threats: Virginia v. Black.35 Part III
addresses the circuit split on the requisite intent needed for speech to
constitute a true threat. This Section also addresses the confusion that
has overwhelmed the circuit courts because of the murky Supreme Court
precedent. Part IV analyzes how the current framework is ill-equipped to
deal with rampant Internet threats and suggests an alternative by
addressing flaws in the current precedent. This note concludes, in Part
V, with a proposition for how courts can proceed in light of the fact that
precedent provides no consistent test for determining what constitutes a
true threat.36 Courts will need to consider how they will address threats
going forward. As a result of the increased incidence of issues involving
Internet speech alongside ambiguous precedent, without clear true threat
jurisprudence, courts risk stifling Internet speech.
provides the following definition: “True threats encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.” 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)) (internal quotations omitted).
33. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 2382 (10th ed. 1999); see also United
States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dubitante) (stating that every
dictionary definition of “threat” has an intent component). While not all threats that fall into the
dictionary description of a threat are punishable by law, the courts still struggle with whether the
intent of the speaker must be considered and to what extent. See id. at 478–79 (discussing
different perspectives for interpreting threats); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359
(2002) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708) (finding that the goal of proscribing true threats is to protect
individuals from “fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur”).
34. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. R
35. 538 U.S. 343 (2002).
36. See infra Part III.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA304.txt unknown Seq: 7 27-AUG-15 11:34
2015] DEFINING INTENT IN 165 CHARACTERS OR LESS 867
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Setting: Ubiquitous Social Media
The prevalence of, and access to, widespread speech is unprece-
dented worldwide with millions of users communicating daily through
social media.37 Using Twitter as an example, as of January 2015, Twitter
had over 284 million active monthly users around the world who send
more than 500 million tweets per day.38 Twitter allows people a kind of
constant and immediate access to each other that they have never had
before.39 People can communicate with others in an essentially anony-
mous manner by merely mentioning another Twitter name in a tweet.40
Twitter users can communicate up to 140 characters to their “followers”
and can directly communicate with others through direct messages or
mentions of the other’s username.41 It is the policy of most social media
sites, including Twitter, that so long as a user’s account is “private,” and
not “public,” users can choose to control who they communicate with,
by prohibiting or blocking all contact with any given person or never
choosing to connect with them at all.42
37. As of September 2014, Facebook had 703 million daily active users on average and 1.35
billion monthly active users, 1.2 billion of whom were using their phone to access the site. See,
e.g., Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2015).
38. See Company, TWITTER, https://about.Twitter.com/company (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
Twitter also owns Vine, a service for sending six-second video clips, which has an additional 40
million users. Id. In all of those communications, if even one percent were to consist of true
threats, that would mean that there were approximately five million tweets sent and received daily
that could give rise to potential lawsuits. Without guidance as to what constitutes a threat and
awareness about this standard, these cases alone could overwhelm the already overworked judicial
system. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. DISTRICT CTS., http://www.us
courts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2014/tables/
D00CMar14.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (showing that at the end of 2014, there were still over
74,000 cases pending before federal district courts).
39. Id. (“Our mission: To give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information
instantly, without barriers.”); see also Segall, supra note 27, at 195–96. R
40. See About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.Twitter.com/articles/
14016 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (stating that any user with a public profile can reach out to
another user through a tweet).
41. See, e.g., About Direct Messages, TWITTER, https://support.Twitter.com/articles/14606-
what-is-a-direct-message-dm (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). Other forms of direct communication
between Twitter users are known as “@Replies” and “Mentions.” Id. “@Replies” will only be
seen by a user if they are following both the sender and recipient of the update. “Mentions” will
only be seen if they are posted by someone that the user is “following.” Id. Finally, users with
protected accounts can only send replies to people they have approved to follow them. Id.; see
also What Are @Replies and Mentions, TWITTER, http://support.Twitter.com/articles/14023-what-
are-replies-and-mentions (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). Additionally, users can report online abuse
directly to Twitter, but Twitter recommends also getting the authorities involved. See Online
Abuse, TWITTER, https://support.Twitter.com/articles/15794-online-abuse (last visited Jan. 11,
2015).
42. Twitter allows for public or private (protected) Twitter accounts. Public accounts can be
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As a result of these privacy settings, some courts have held that the
First Amendment expansively protects speech on Twitter, because peo-
ple may join and leave discussions as they please.43 Thinking back to the
journalist discussed at the beginning of this note, one might wonder why
she did not simply make her profile private or why she allowed people
she did not know to contact her so freely. Could she have protected
herself by only allowing those she personally knew to follow her? Theo-
retically, yes. However, because this journalist, like many others,
believes that open access to Twitter provides great benefits, from her
perspective a public Twitter page is necessary.44
Whereas Twitter’s 140-character limit and ability to create virtual
anonymity feeds the temptation for many users to instigate “shouting
matches” with each other, threats in these “shouting matches” rarely
indicate real danger in the eyes of public figures, including the journalist
discussed here.45 Further, Twitter is an indispensible tool for journalists
and average users everywhere because it provides interaction with large
audiences and a venue to spur public debate worldwide, which some-
times leads groups to rally to enact change.46 The fact that much of this
speech may be anonymous does not deny it First Amendment protection,
nor does it make it more likely to fall into an unprotected class of
speech.47 To the contrary, some courts have noted that communication
between Twitter users is voluntary and completely severable at any point
in time, and as such, Twitter speech is afforded a higher level of First
Amendment protection than if the speech were mandatory or the audi-
followed by anyone without approval (allowing for communication with any follower) and can be
seen online by anyone, even those without Twitter accounts. Protected Twitter accounts require
each person to be individually approved for communication and profile visibility. See About
Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.Twitter.com/articles/14016 (last visited
Jan. 11, 2015). Another form of social media that allows users to post pictures and comment on
them, Instagram, similarly allows for private profiles to be seen only by approved users, while
public profiles can be seen by all. See FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2015). Users will only see the posts of those who they are “following” and any
comments their friends may post. Id.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577–78 (D. Md. 2011) (finding
that communication on Twitter is completely voluntary, making it much different than an e-mail
or personal telephone call).
44. See Bomb Threat, supra note 11. R
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (“Even the Federalist Papers, written in
favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is plain that
anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.”); but see
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162–63 (2002)
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940)) (“‘[A] State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him
publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the
cause which he purports to represent.’”).
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ence were somehow captive.48
While Internet speech can bring great benefits, such as the ability to
quickly warn large groups of imminent danger, it can also supply
equally formidable dangers. Internet speech provides the means for a
user to widely disseminate false information or to incite violence.49
Social media gives a new power to each individual’s speech, thus
increasing the need for guidance from the courts on the parameters of
protected speech.50 Given that “liking” something on Facebook has been
held by the Fourth Circuit to be a form of free speech,51 is liking some-
one else’s threatening status on Facebook enough to constitute a “true
threat”? If this simple action could be a true threat, what level of intent
would courts have to ascribe to the “liker”? While this note does not
fully resolve these issues, it will explain the need for clarity in the true
threat intent jurisprudence, emphasizing the need for consistency in the
digital world.
B. Where It All Began: United States v. Watts
The true threats doctrine was first articulated in United States v.
Watts, a case involving a young man who threatened to kill the Presi-
dent.52 In Watts, a young man attending a rally at the Washington Monu-
ment joined an open discussion about police brutality.53 Opposing views
were expressed and one member of the discussion instigated an argu-
ment with the defendant by proclaiming that young people should get an
48. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 577–78 (finding that Twitter communications are completely
voluntary and, therefore, are much different than an e-mail or personal telephone call). Despite
holding that Twitter is voluntary, in part because users can block whoever they choose, anyone
can be included in a “hashtag,” where users can talk about a common subject that is then compiled
into a searchable database by Twitter. For example, if one wanted to say that they were unhappy
with Justin Bieber, they could do so by posting a tweet that said “I hate #JustinBieber,” and
Twitter would clump that together with tweets from other users who use “#JustinBieber.” See
Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITTER, http://support.Twitter.com/articles/49309-using-hashtags-
on-Twitter (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
49. See Christina DesMarias, Twitter Used for Social Good and to Incite Disorder, PC
WORLD (Sept. 25, 2011, 7:28 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/240574/Twitter_used_
for_social_good_and_to_incite_disorder.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (listing examples of
occasions where Twitter was used to incite violence and riots).
50. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and “True Threats,” 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 283, 286 (2001) (“[I]nterest in threats has been sparked primarily by the proliferation of
widely disseminated Internet speech.”).
51. Cf. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43, 54–56 (1994)) (“In sum, liking a political candidate’s campaign page communicates
the user’s approval of the candidate and supports the campaign by associating the user with it. In
this way, it is the Internet equivalent of displaying a political sign in one’s front yard, which the
Supreme Court has held is substantive speech.”).
52. 394 U.S. 705, 705–06 (1969) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 706.
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education before expressing their views.54 In response, the defendant
Watts spoke out averring that he had been given a 1-A draft classifica-
tion and “‘[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get
in my sights is L.B.J.’ ‘They are not going to make me kill my black
brothers.’”55 The lower court found that Watts had violated a statute that
proscribed threatening the President.56 Watts, however, claimed he did
not actually intend to shoot the President.57 Instead, he contended that he
merely expressed disapproval with the President’s politics; in other
words, his speech was just political hyperbole.58 On appeal, the Supreme
Court found that while the statute was valid, because there were compel-
ling reasons for banning threats against the President, it was still neces-
sary to consider the First Amendment to ensure that “what is a threat [is]
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”59
In defining a true threat, the Watts Court made two important find-
ings. First, the Court cast doubt on the intent standard, which, at the
time, turned on whether the speaker intended to carry out his threat.60
Despite support from the lower courts, Watts essentially removed this
interpretation of intent from the true threat jurisprudence.61 Second, the
Watts Court clarified that just because language is “crude” or “vitupera-
tive, abusive, and inexact,” does not render it unprotected—instead, the
context of speech must be assessed through the “reaction of the listen-
ers.”62 The Court emphasized that when evaluating context, it is impor-
tant to consider the “expressly conditional nature of the statement.”63
Nevertheless, following Watts, whether a threat is conditional has been
largely ignored as a factor in the lower courts.64 By looking at the con-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 705; see also 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1962) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully . . .
makes any such threat against the President . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.”).
57. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
58. Id. at 708.
59. Id. at 707.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 707–08. The Second Circuit, for example, concluded that the pertinent inquiry was
whether the speaker could carry out a threat, rather than whether the threat was merely
conditional. See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that when a
threat “on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific . . . as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution,” it is a true threat).
62. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08.
63. Id. at 708.
64. Id. at 707–09. But see United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 961 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that conditional language is not dispositive); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569,
1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that conditional language is present in most threats because “the
threatener hopes . . . he won’t have to carry out the threats”); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d
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text and reaction of the listeners, the Court concluded that Watts’ state-
ment was not a “true threat,” but instead merely an expressive way of
stating he disagreed with the President.65 The Court emphasized the
importance of protecting Watts’ speech because it was political in
nature, and therefore it was the exact type of speech the founding fathers
intended the First Amendment to protect to the utmost degree.66
In Watts, the Supreme Court made clear that not all threatening
words fall outside of the protection of the First Amendment, stating,
“what is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally
protected speech.”67 There, the Court found the speech of the defendant
to be protected speech as political hyperbole, not a threat.68 Yet, Watts
did not provide a clear standard for the requisite level of intent needed
for a true threat.69 Instead, the Court relied on precedent that merely
required an intent to communicate.70 Simultaneously, the Court cast
doubt on this standard in the opinion’s dicta.71 In an opinion that came
months after Watts, the Ninth Circuit clarified that for a statement to
constitute a true threat, the prosecution need not show that the speaker
actually intended to carry out the threat, but left the rest of the intent
standard clear as mud.72
703, 711 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he conditional nature of [the] statement does not make the statement
any less of a ‘true threat’ simply because a contingency may be involved.”).
65. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. Perhaps supporting political speech is so important, not only
because of the importance of free debate in the political realm, but also because this debate has a
historical tendency to turn into distasteful name calling and untrue statements. The tactic of
“mudslinging” has been used for years to encourage others to vote against a particular candidate.
United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[M]udslinging has long been
a staple of U.S. presidential elections. . . . [Looking at] the experience of our Founding Fathers[,
i]n the country’s first contested presidential election of 1800, supporters of Thomas Jefferson
claimed that incumbent John Adams wanted to marry off his son to the daughter of King George
III to create an American dynasty under British rule; Adams supporters called Jefferson ‘a
meanspirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a halfbreed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto
father.’ Abraham Lincoln was derided as an ape, ghoul, lunatic, and savage, while Andrew
Jackson was accused of adultery and murder, and opponents of Grover Cleveland chanted slogans
that he had fathered a child out-of-wedlock.”). More recently, in the 2012 U.S. presidential
election, President Obama endured racial slurs as well as claims by his opponents that he was
Muslim and foreign born. Id.
66. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
67. Id. at 707.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 707–08.
70. Id.
71. Id. (discussing the intent to communicate standard, the Court expressed that “perhaps this
interpretation is correct, although we have grave doubts about it”). This note does not focus on the
intent to communicate standard in the digital world, as this is another vast area of true threat
jurisprudence that would be the proper subject of another paper.
72. Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[E]ven though the maker of the
threat does not have an actual intention to assault the President, an apparently serious threat may
cause the mischief or evil toward which the statute was in part directed.”). However, it is
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After Watts, very little guidance could be derived from Supreme
Court precedent to clarify the standard for true threats until 2003 when
Virginia v. Black was decided. As a consequence of the minimal guid-
ance, courts turned to cases interpreting other categories of unprotected
speech, such as fighting words, incitement, and imminent lawless action,
in attempts to create a consistent test for true threats.73 This only further
muddled the true threat’s test.
C. The Confusion Continues: Virginia v. Black
On April 7, 2003, the day Virginia v. Black was decided,74 there
was no Facebook,75 no Twitter,76 no Instagram,77 and certainly no
Snapchat.78 Yet, Black, a case largely concerned with speech based on
viewpoint discrimination, changed the way that courts evaluate true
threats.79 Black was the first time the Supreme Court entangled itself,
perhaps unintentionally, in the debate about whether the true threat doc-
trine required the speaker to have subjectively intended his or her state-
ment to be threating.80 In Black, the defendants were accused of burning
crosses in violation of a Virginia law banning all cross burning con-
ducted with the intent to intimidate.81 While the majority of the opinion
important to note that in this case the speaker was threatening the life of the President, and the
operator who took the phone call knew that the caller was stationed at a military base near
weapons. Id. at 878.
73. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
381 (1992) (describing the hierarchy of speech and categorizing true threats as “fighting words”);
see also Paul Crane, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1230 (2006)
(“[T]he classification of true threats as unprotected speech is clearly congruent with
[Chaplinsky’s] rationale of regulating expression that by its ‘very utterance inflicts injury.’”)
(citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). See generally Segall, supra
note 27. For a good example of lower courts conflating the fighting words standard with true
threats, see United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 512 (4th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the intent
standard of true threats using Bradenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which defined the
parameters of incitement to imminent lawless action, not true threats).
74. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
75. See Our Mission, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/Timeline (last visited Jan. 11,
2015).
76. See Milestones, TWITTER, https://about.Twitter.com/milestones (last visited Jan. 11,
2015).
77. See Press, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/press/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015) (Instagram
launched on October 6, 2010).
78. J.J. Colao, The Inside Story of Snapchat: The World’s Hottest App or a 3 Billion Dollar
Disappearing Act, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2014/01/
06/the-inside-story-of-snapchat-the-worlds-hottest-app-or-a-3-billion-disappearing-act/; see also
SNAPCHAT, https://www.snapchat.com/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
79. See generally Crane, supra note 73 (analyzing and explaining the discord in circuit courts
regarding the intent standard for true threats after Black); see also infra Part IV.
80. Jeffries Petition for Certiorari, supra note 31, at 8.
81. The statute read in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
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focused on the nuances of content-based proscriptions of speech, the
Supreme Court ultimately found that the statute in question, with regard
to true threats, was constitutional.82 The Court reasoned that the statute
did not interdict pure speech because it banned only the subset of cross
burning that amounted to true threats.83
In briefly defining true threats, the Court transformed the requisite
level of intent required for speech to constitute a true threat with one
sentence.84 Citing Watts, the Court defined true threats as, “encom-
pass[ing] those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to
a particular individual or group of individuals.”85 This one sentence
impelled a debate in the lower courts regarding the requisite level of
intent required for a statement to cross the threshold of true threats, with
circuit courts reading this same line to require different types of intent.86
The Black Court limited the definition of intent by stating that a
speaker need not intend to carry out a threat in order for the threat to be
proscribed, as the Court did in Watts, but did not clarify any further.87
Ultimately, the Court ruled that intimidation is a subset of true threats
and, as such, cross burning with the intent to intimidate can be prohib-
ited without violating First Amendment freedoms.88 At the time Black
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a
cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of
persons.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003).
82. Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“A ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate
is fully consistent with our holding in R.A.V. and is proscribable under the First Amendment.”).
However, the Court found that the prima facie evidence provision in the statute was
unconstitutional, and remanded the judgment for further proceedings. Id. at 367.
83. Id. at 363 (“The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with
the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation.
Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of
intimidating messages in light of cross burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of
impending violence. Thus, just as a State may regulate only that obscenity which is the most
obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a State choose to prohibit only those forms of
intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”).
84. Crane, supra note 73, at 1254.
85. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)) (internal
quotations omitted). The Court’s definition of “true threats” uses 165 characters, just slightly
more than allowable in a tweet, yet it has created a huge difference of opinion in what constitutes
a true threat in the circuits.
86. See infra Part III.
87. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.
Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from
the disruption that fear engenders . . . .’”) (alteration in original) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
88. Id. at 361 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of
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was decided, legal scholars believed it would bolster free speech protec-
tion in true threat cases; however, this was misguided, and time has
shown that instead Black failed to restore a stricter standard for true
threats to the lower courts.89
D. The Need for Clarity: Current Federal Threat Statutes
While the constitutional confusion lingers, the standard for true
threats remains a significant problem.90 The definition of true threats and
the requisite level of intent effects a myriad of federal threat statutes; as
a result, the confusion surrounding intent jurisprudence following Black
has only served to further compound the inconsistencies and chaos of
federal threat statute enforcement.91 Without guidance as to the requisite
level of intent for a true threat under federal law, there can be no expec-
tation of consistent application of federal laws involving threats includ-
ing violations of statutes proscribing blackmail, threats against the
President, interference with commerce, and improper influence of a fed-
eral official.92 Each of the aforementioned statutes could be implicated
in Internet speech. Combine the ubiquity of social media with the large
number of cases filed implicating these statutes, and it becomes evident
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”).
89. Compare Lauren Gilbert, Mocking George: Political Satire as “True Threat” in the Age
of Global Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 844 (2004) (“This Article looks at various
incidents in the context of the erosion of the true threat doctrine by lower federal courts, and then
examines the implications of the Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Black, which appears to
have restored the speech-protective aspects of that doctrine.”), with P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating
Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet
Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 52–53 (2015) (“As the confusion in the true
threats doctrine continues to impact public Internet speech, the divergent interpretations of Black
raise First Amendment concerns regarding the responsibility that a speaker bears for virulent
expression communicated to an unknown, yet interconnected, audience.”).
90. In fact, this same topic has been presented to the Supreme Court on at least five occasions
since 2008. See Vaksman v. United States, 472 F. App’x 447 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 777 (2012) (applying both the objective and subjective tests to determine if an email was
threatening); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107
(2012); United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1181 (2009);
see also Jeffries Petition for Certiorari, supra note 31. R
91. Jeffries Petition for Certiorari, supra note 31. R
92. See 18 § U.S.C. 875(c) (2006) (proscribing “any threat to injure the person of another”
sent over the Internet); 18 U.S.C. § 873 (stating that in regards to blackmail, “whoever, under a
threat of informing or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the
United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned”); 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (“whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be
delivered as aforesaid, any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another”); 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (“whoever
corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to
influence, intimidate or impede any grand or petit juror”). See also Jeffries Petition for Certiorari,
supra note 31. R
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that the true threats doctrine needs clarification.93 Furthermore, the juris-
prudence surrounding social media provides no more guidance than that
for true threats. Even the American Bar Association (“A.B.A.”) has
expressed its fears about the potential for unintentional misuse of social
media by attorneys and judges—those groups who understand the law
the best—warning both groups to be prudent in monitoring their
accounts and to think before clicking.94 This has left the boundaries of
the First Amendment blurred when it comes to social media, even
amongst those most familiar with the law.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:
STANDARDS OF INTENT IN THE CIRCUITS AFTER BLACK
After Black, the majority of circuit courts adopted an objective
intent standard to identify when speech constitutes a true threat.95 The
circuits that continue to apply purely objective standards read Black as
simply requiring the speaker to convey a general intent to “transmit the
communication,” as opposed to a specific intent to make the recipient
feel threatened.96 Yet, even those courts that apply the objective test are
fragmented.97
Courts have developed three different objective tests: a viewpoint-
neutral objective test, a reasonable speaker-focused objective test, and a
reasonable recipient-focused objective test.98 While the courts that adopt
objective tests generally acknowledge that the Court in Black considered
93. See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://
www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/tsec.cfm (select “Number of defendants in cases filed” and all years between
1994 and 2012; then “select by title and section within the U.S.C.”; then select a title, “18—
Crimes and Criminal Procedure,” and choose section “18 875 C,” with PDF output option) (last
visited Apr. 4, 2015) (documenting that thousands of defendants between 1994 and 2012 have
been charged for violations of statutes implicating true threats).
94. The A.B.A. expresses concerns about judges and attorneys associating on social media,
because there are no guarantees of privacy and people have no control over the reactions or
postings of their friends. See James Podgers, ABA Opinion Cautions Judges to Avoid Ethics
Pitfalls of Social Media, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
aba_opinion_cautions_judges_to_avoid_ethics_pitfalls_of_social_media/.
95. See United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 985 (11th Cir. 2013) (adopting an objective
intent standard for true threats); United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013) (same);
United States v. Ambien, 663 F.3d 322, 330 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Stewart, 411
F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
96. See, e.g., Ambien, 663 F.3d at 330. This is the same standard that Watts cast doubt on
even before Black. United States v. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (when discussing the
intent to communicate standard, the Court expressed, “Perhaps this interpretation is correct,
although we have grave doubts about it”).
97. United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 509–10 (4th Cir. 2012).
98. See Elonis, 730 F.3d at 329–30 (applying a reasonable speaker standard); Martinez, 736
F.3d at 985 (applying a viewpoint-neutral objective standard); White, 670 F. 3d at 513 (applying a
reasonable recipient standard).
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a subjective element, the subjective element of the opinion is disre-
garded as a mere consequence of the specific statute at issue in Black—
not a new requirement for a subjective gloss in the constitutional defini-
tion of true threats.99 Most courts that choose to adopt an objective test
express contempt for the subjective test under the belief it would be
overly protective of threatening speech.100 Nevertheless, after Black,
many judges who adopt the objective test question the tenability of a
purely objective test in dicta or separate opinions.101 Therefore, even
circuits that comprise the majority are divided by inconsistency amongst
not only the circuits, but also the individual judges, producing a large
discrepancy as to the correct level of intent for true threats.102
Adding to the conflicted interpretations of Black, the minority of
circuits currently apply a hybrid test that considers both an objective test
and a subjective intent test.103 The circuits that read a subjective element
into Black do so based on Black’s reasoning that true threats only arise
when the “speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent.”104 As a result of the tension created by the circuit courts con-
flicting standards for assessing the requisite intent for true threats, it is
nearly impossible for a speaker whose words could easily reach any cir-
cuit via the Internet to predict what speech is protected and what speech
is not. Furthermore, even the current balance of power seems subject to
change as the Second, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits appear disposed to
abandon the purely objective test.105
99. White, 670 F.3d at 508–10.
100. See Elonis, 730 F.3d at 329–30 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)) (“Limiting the definition of true threats to only those statements where the speaker
subjectively intended to threaten would fail to protect individuals from ‘the fear of violence’ and
the ‘disruption that fear engenders,’ because it would protect speech that a reasonable speaker
would understand to be threatening.”). Part IV assesses whether this is a legitimate worry or if it is
an inflated worry.
101. See United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that after Black it is
“likely . . . that an entirely objective definition is no longer tenable”); Jeffries v. United States, 692
F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (the case for a subjective intent standard is “not frivolous”); id. at
484 (Sutton, J., dubitante) (“If words matter, I am hard pressed to understand why these
definitions do not resolve today’s case. The definitions, all of them, show that subjective intent is
part and parcel of the meaning of a communicated ‘threat’ to injure another.”); see also United
States v. Eagleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the general intent to
communicate standard in favor of an intent to threaten, but finding defendant’s challenge
procedurally barred).
102. See Crane, supra note 73.
103. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631–32 (2005); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d
473, 479 (6th Cir. 2013).
104. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2012); United
States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622,
632 (9th Cir. 2005).
105. See Jeffries Petition for Certiorari, supra note 31 (noting the deep disagreement in the R
circuits regarding the intent standard for true threats). For a discussion of the potential for change,
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A. The Viewpoint-Neutral Objective Test
Both the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits adopted the viewpoint-neutral
objective test for true threats, which analyzes speech through the lens of
a reasonable person without denoting whose perspective the threat is
interpreted through—the speaker or the listener.106 Under this objective
test, a statement is a true threat if it “would cause a reasonable person to
construe it as a serious intention to inflict bodily harm.”107 The practical
effect of this test is that courts may look at both what the reasonable
speaker would have foreseen and how the reasonable recipient would
have received the critique; the court can then give more weight to factors
on either side in making a decision. Under this approach, the court is not
confined by the perspective of either the speaker or the recipient, either
of which at any time may be inadequate to obtain a conviction. When a
court is not tied to one viewpoint, it may be easier to obtain convictions
because there is flexibility to interpret a statement as a threat. At the
same time, the strength of this test may also be its downfall as it may be
too easy to convict because the criteria is not fixed and is therefore sub-
ject to multiple interpretations. Moreover, this test is sound only if the
reason that the Black Court incorporated subjective intent was simply
because the cross burning statute at issue contained a subjective element.
If, instead, the Black Court intended to incorporate a subjective test into
all threat cases, regardless of the statute at issue, then a purely objective
test is directly contradictory to binding precedent.
Nevertheless, it is not clear if either circuit gives Black the proper
weight as the Eleventh Circuit relies heavily on Watts, finding that the
Court reached its conclusions using the objective characteristics of the
speech.108 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s post-Black test is based on dicta
from a pre-Black opinion, defining a true threat as “unprotected if an
objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a ‘serious
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.’”109 As a
see infra Part III.C. Further, the controlling Eighth Circuit case fails to directly address the intent
standard in relation to Black. See United States v. Koski, 424 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2005) (failing to
even mention Black).
106. See United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 985 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Importantly, the
Court reached this conclusion based on the objective characteristics of the speech and the context
in which it was delivered—the Court did not speculate as to the speaker’s subjective mental
state.”); see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004)
(interpreting speech from the perspective of an “an objectively reasonable person”); United States
v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (A statement is a true threat if “a
reasonable person [would] construe it as a serious intention to inflict bodily harm.”).
107. See Alaboud, 347 F.3d at 1297–98 & n.3.
108. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 984–85.
109. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 616 (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
616 (8th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. O’Dwyer, 443 F. App’x 18, 19 (5th Cir. 2011)
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result, both courts avoid the possible subjective interpretation presented
by Black by citing to pre-Black precedent.
1. CASE STUDY: INTERNET THREATS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
In United States v. Martinez, the Eleventh Circuit was tasked with
determining the requisite level of intent needed after Black.110 In Marti-
nez, an anonymous email was sent to a radio talk-show host, stating,
I felt your plan to organize people with guns in the hills of Kentucky
and else where was a great idea. I know that you know one election is
not enough to take our country back from the illegal aliens, [J]ews,
[M]uslims, and illuminati who are running the show. . . . [I am] plan-
ning something big around a government building here . . . I’m going
to walk in and teach all the government hacks working there what the
2nd amendment is all about . . . we’ll end this year of 2010 in a blaze
of glory  . . . what does sarah say, don’t retreat, reload!111
Within a few hours, the show received a phone call from an anony-
mous woman stating that the email was from her mentally-ill husband
who she believed was going to a school to open fire; she pleaded for the
station’s assistance.112 The police locked down the schools in the area
and identified the communications as coming from defendant Martinez’s
home; thereafter, Martinez was arrested for her allegedly threatening call
to the radio and was charged.113 At trial, Martinez contended that for her
statements to constitute true threats post-Black, a subjective intent test
was required.114 The court disagreed, finding instead that limiting the
definition of intent to subjective intent would result in overprotection of
(“[I]n its context [it] would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator
will act according to its tenor.”).
110. 736 F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2013).
111. Id. at 983.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 985. In Martinez, the mentally ill husband who allegedly threatened to shoot school
children was not the one charged with making a threatening statement; instead, it was his wife
who had called the threat into the radio station that was charged. Id. at 983. It is my opinion that
this case should have been decided under the prohibition against incitement of imminent lawless
action—not true threats—as she is in jail for reporting an event that could have incited the public
to act. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (describing incitement as “[t]he line
between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible . . . .
The example usually given by those who would punish speech is the case of one who falsely
shouts fire in a crowded theatre.”).
114. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 984. While Martinez disputed the test used, she conceded that her
email contained “language that an objectively reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt to be a serious expression of an intent to injure another person.” Id. It may also sound
counterintuitive that the wife here, the caller, is being charged for statements that she purported
her husband made. However, she called the station, reporting her husband’s threat, and in doing so
she made a threatening statement. Id.
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threating speech.115
The court reasoned that Black could be distinguished from the pre-
sent case because in Black the issue was intimidating threats, which
require a specific inquiry into the speaker’s intent, while the case at hand
dealt with general threats.116 Accordingly, the court applied the view-
point-neutral reasonable person test, derived from Watts, classifying
speech as a true threat when “the communication would be construed by
a reasonable person as a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily
harm or death.”117 Therefore, the court found that the defendant had no
remedy on appeal as she conceded that, objectively, her statements were
such that a reasonable person would have perceived her threats as real,
and therefore her statements constituted true threats.118 In so holding, the
court also brushed aside any subjective intent implications contained in
Black.119
B. The Objective Reasonable Speaker Test
The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits use a reasonable speaker
standard, grounding their interpretations of a true threat in how the “rea-
sonable speaker” would “foresee that the statement would be inter-
preted.”120 All three circuits have revisited the question of intent since
the decision in Black; yet, like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, these
three circuits continue to fashion their tests around pre-Black prece-
dent.121 The objective speaker test classifies speech as a true threat if
“the sender should have reasonably foreseen that the recipient would
interpret it as such.”122 In a pre-Black decision, United States v. Fulmer,
the First Circuit validated jury instructions, which indicated that a rea-
sonable speaker test was preferable to a reasonable recipient test.123 In
115. Id. at 987–88.
116. Id. at 987.
117. Id. at 988 (also considering if a “reasonable person would perceive the threat as real”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 987.
120. United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (analyzing a threat to the
President and finding that “[i]n light of the objective standard laid out above, Fuller’s subjective
intent to carry out the threat is not relevant to the question of whether the letter constituted a ‘true
threat’”); see also United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 135–36 (3d Cir. 2004) (determining if
speech is a true threat by looking at the perspective of “a reasonable person hearing . . . or
receiving the communication”); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (“A
true threat is one that a reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the communication would
find threatening.”).
121. Fuller, 387 F.3d at 647 (supporting the objective standard using Watts and other cases
from the 1970s); Zavrel, 384 F.3d at 136 (citing to United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.
1994), a pre-Black case, for support); Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d at 16 (relying on pre-Black
precedent by citing United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492–93 (1st Cir. 1997)).
122. United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013).
123. 108 F.3d 1486, 1494 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Trial Transcript 4 at 84–87) (“When we talk
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choosing to apply a reasonable speaker test, the courts rely on the suppo-
sition that “the perils that inhere in the ‘reasonable-recipient standard,’
namely that the jury will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipi-
ent,” are allayed when a reasonable speaker test is employed.124
The First Circuit recently revisited the question of intent required
for speech to be considered a true threat in United States v. Clemens, and
failed to depart from the Circuit’s earlier decision to utilize an objective
test.125 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Fuller, also
applying a reasonable speaker standard, relied on historical standards to
rationalize not interpreting Black as proffering a subjective standard.126
While the court did not clarify the reasoning behind the use of a reason-
able speaker standard instead of a reasonable recipient standard, it did
illuminate that the use of a subjective test would “hinder the govern-
ment’s ability to prosecute threats.”127 The Seventh Circuit only rejected
the subjective intent standard by defining it as requiring a subjective
intent to carry out the threat or an actual present ability to carry it out—
the only intent standard specifically renounced by the Supreme Court.128
In a more recent case, United States v. Parr, the Seventh Circuit
assessed the effect that Black had on a purely objective test, finding that
it was highly possible that a purely objective test may no longer be tena-
ble.129 Further, in the dicta of Parr, the Seventh Circuit indicated that
post-Black the correct standard may need to consider that the “statement
at issue must objectively be a threat and subjectively be intended as
such.”130 As a result, speculatively, the Seventh Circuit may be prone to
change its test in the future.
Like the Fifth Circuit,131 even before Black, the Third Circuit has
consistently held that speech was considered an unprotected true threat
when “a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
about a defendant’s—about the defendant’s intent, we are talking about what he meant to do and
what was in his mind. This is difficult to prove directly, because there is no way directly to
scrutinize the works of someone else’s mind or his state of mind. But you may infer . . . the
defendant’s intent from the surrounding circumstances, that is to say, you may rely on
circumstantial evidence in determining the defendant’s intent.”).
124. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491.
125. Clemens, 738 F.3d at 14 (citing United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir.
1997)).
126. Fuller, 387 F.3d at 646.
127. Id. at 647.
128. Id. at 648; see supra Part II (discussing how, in both Watts and Black, the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the intent standard that looked at the speaker’s ability to carry out the threat).
129. United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2008).
130. Id. However, this was merely dicta, and the court still claimed to stand by the objective
test based in circuit precedent. See id.
131. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Doe
v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as
a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.”132 This stan-
dard is still used today, even after Black.133 In a recent Third Circuit
decision, United States v. Elonis, the court explicitly found that Black
did not create a subjective intent component for assessing true threats,
but instead reaffirmed the objective reasonable-speaker test.134 How-
ever, this may change soon, as Elonis is being reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the 2014–2015 term.135
1. CASE STUDY: INTERNET THREATS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The reasonable speaker test from the Third Circuit considers
whether a “reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be
interpreted as a threat.”136 In this case, Elonis, the defendant, was a
depressed man whose wife had left him and taken their children.137 His
depression was apparent to other employees at the amusement park
where he worked.138 After the Halloween season ended at the park,
Elonis posted on his Facebook page a picture of him from the Halloween
festivities in costume holding a knife to his coworker’s neck.139 Below
the photo, he captioned it: “I wish.”140 Elonis was fired after his man-
ager saw the photo.141 After losing his job, Elonis began to post
Facebook statuses about how he wished his ex-wife were dead so that he
could commit vile acts to her corpse.142 While the words were offensive,
the defendant perceived them to be in a lyrical “rap” format styled after
his favorite artists.143 Further, he indicated on his Facebook page that
posting the song lyrics was therapeutic to him.144 As a result, a protec-
tive order was issued for Elonis’ ex-wife.145 Elonis then went on to post
another rap on his Facebook, also styled after one of his favorite artists,
132. United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991).
133. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the reasonable
recipient test), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
134. Id.
135. Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (granting certiorari).




140. Id. at 324.
141. Id.
142. Id. The text of two of the more strongly worded statuses are as follows: “If I only knew
then what I know now, I would have smothered [you] with a pillow, dumped your body in the
back seat, dropped you off in Toad Creek, and made it look like a rape and murder,” and “There’s
one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not going to rest until your body is a
mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Id.
143. Brief for Appellant at 8–9, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (No. 12-3798).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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about how it was illegal for him to state he wanted to kill his ex-wife
and then went into detail about how it would be “incredibly illegal,
extremely illegal, to go on Facebook and say something like the best
place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would be from the cornfield
behind it because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a
clear line of sight through the sun room.”146 The defendant continued to
post statements about the acts he would commit because he felt he was
not being justly treated in the judicial system.147
After the lower court found Elonis guilty of threatening both his
wife and his coworker, he appealed.148 Relying on Black, he claimed
that the Supreme Court had created a requirement that courts look at
both a subjective and objective intent when determining what constitutes
a true threat.149 The Third Circuit, however, disagreed, asserting that the
decision in Black did not find the objective test unconstitutional.150 The
court reasoned that Black’s subjective component was merely a result of
the cross burning statute at issue, and therefore the analysis performed of
subjective intent was a direct result of the challenged statute’s legislative
construction, not new constitutional implications.151
Thus, the objective reasonable speaker test remains intact in the
Third Circuit.152 Under the objective reasonable speaker test, the court
found that Elonis did in fact issue true threats through his Facebook
page.153 This was the court’s holding despite the fact that the statements
he issued were not specifically directed at his ex-wife and that she had,
in fact, gone looking for his comments by finding his Facebook page
even though they were not “friends.”154 The Supreme Court will decide
146. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 325. The inspiration comes from a sketch from The Whitest Kids U
Know, which talks about how it is illegal to say “I want to kill the President of the United States of
America.” See Whitest Kids U Know: It is Illegal to Say, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2007), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEQOvyGbBtY.
147. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 325. Some of these “lyrics” are as follows: “Fold up your [Protection
from Abuse Order (“PFA”)] and put it in your pocket[;] is it thick enough to stop a bullet? Try to
enforce an Order [t]hat was improperly granted in the first place[.] Me thinks the judge needs an
education on true threat jurisprudence[.] And prison time will add zeroes to my settlement[ ]. . . .
And if worse comes to worse[,] I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the state police and the
sheriff’s department.” Id. at 325–26 (emphasis added).




152. Id. However, this may change as this case is currently before the Supreme Court. Elonis v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (granting certiorari).
153. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 325.
154. Brief for Appellant, supra note 143, at 8–9 (“There was no evidence that any of the
charged victims in this case (Mr. Elonis’s wife, law enforcement agencies or agents, or schools)
were his Facebook ‘friends.’ Facebook users who affirmatively chose to be designated a
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Elonis in the 2014–2015 term.155
C. The Objective Reasonable Recipient Test
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits all apply an
objective “reasonable recipient” test, which looks at whether a reason-
able recipient who is familiar with the context of the statement would
see the speech as a “serious expression of an intent to do harm.”156 This
test, in theory, has the benefit of allowing the fact-finder to interpret the
threat as a reasonable recipient should have, without struggling to deter-
mine what the speaker’s state of mind was and avoiding the issue of a
particularly sensitive recipient.157 However, critics often point out that in
reality this test is flawed; it fails to weed out overly sensitive recipients
or jurors, because the jury still receives the information from the actual
recipient on the stand and then processes it in accordance with their own
reaction or the victim’s reaction.158
In Rogers v. United States, which was decided before Black, Justice
Marshall attempted to untangle the issue of intent in his discussion of
the boundaries between unprotected threatening speech and protected
speech.159 In that discussion, he acknowledged that because the objec-
tive test exclusively measures the impact of speech on the recipient, it
has the prospect of creating a chilling effect because it is overly inclu-
sive of both pure speech and “true threats.”160 Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit and cohorts continue to apply an objective test,161 even after
Black.162 The underlying reasoning is that the objective test is not overly
‘Facebook friend’ of Elonis’s would see his postings, alongside those of their other ‘friends,’ on a
page within the Facebook website called the ‘newsfeed.’”).
155. Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
156. Jeffries v. United States, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. White, 670
F.3d 498, 509–10 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Koski, 424 F.3d 812, 818–20 (8th Cir. 2005);
see also United States v. Jongewaard, 567 F.3d 336, 339 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In this circuit, the
test for distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech is whether an
objectively reasonable recipient would interpret the purported threat ‘as a serious expression of an
intent to harm or cause injury to another.”’), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1502 (2010); United States v.
Wolff, 370 F. App’x 888, 892 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 305 (2d
Cir. 2006) (affirming the objective reasonable recipient test post-Black without proffering
reasoning as to why); United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 2013).
157. See Comment, First Circuit Defines Threat in the Context of Federal Threat Statutes:
United States v. Fulmer, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1114 (1998).
158. Rothman, supra note 50, at 319–21. R
159. 42 U.S. 35, 45 (1975).
160. Id. at 46–47.
161. See supra note 156. But see United States v. Dinwiddle, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) R
(finding that determining how a reasonable recipient would interpret speech may require
consideration of potentially subjective material, including (1) “reaction of the recipient and other
listeners”; (2) “whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a
propensity to engage in violence”; and (3) whether the threat was made directly to the victim).
162. United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 509–10 (4th Cir. 2012); see also United States v.
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inclusive because the fact-finder must still consider the context in which
the speech occurred.163 Further, while some scholars posited that the
Tenth Circuit had adopted a subjective intent standard after Black,164 in
an unpublished opinion the Tenth Circuit continued to apply the objec-
tive reasonable recipient standard.165 Presumably these courts are fol-
lowing the axiom of better safe than sorry.166
The Second Circuit’s standard for true threats also relies on pre-
Black precedent, defining the standard as “an objective one—namely,
whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the con-
text of the [communication] would interpret it as a threat of injury.”167
However, the Second Circuit’s entire analysis of the Black Court’s intent
standard occurred in a footnote, exposing potential vulnerability for
change, like in the Seventh Circuit.168
In United States v. Turner, the defendant was accused of threaten-
ing federal judges on his blog when he expressed that the Seventh Cir-
cuit judges, who had recently made a ruling regarding the Second
Amendment’s application to the states, should die for not following the
Constitution.169 Turner subsequently posted on his blog the work
Koski, 424 F.3d 812, 818–20 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 135–36 (3d
Cir. 2004) (determining if speech is a true threat by looking at the perspective of “a reasonable
person hearing . . . or receiving the communication”); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6,
15 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying an objective test in the context of presidential threats).
163. Jeffries v. United States, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2013).
164. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 73.
165. United States v. Wolff, 370 F. App’x 888, 892 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir. 2001)) (“The trier of fact, therefore, must decide
whether a ‘reasonable person would find that a threat existed.’”). However, Magleby was decided
prior to Black.
166. The Fourth Circuit’s test for true threats asks whether “‘an ordinary reasonable recipient
who is familiar with the context . . . would interpret [the statement] as a threat of injury.’” United
States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d
889, 891 (4th Cir. 1990)).
167. United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Malik,
16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While this case proffered the
standard for threats post-Black, it failed to address any potential change as a result of Black.
168. While the Second Circuit’s first post-Black precedent can be found in Davila, 461 F.3d at
305, in a 2013 decision, the Second Circuit revisited the issue, noting that “[t]his Court’s decision
in Davila post-dates, but did not address, Virginia v. Black” and went on to further dismiss the
need for analysis because the defendant satisfied both a subjective and an objective test. United
States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that Black did
alter the definition of ‘true threats’ to require subjective intent to intimidate, the outcome in this
case would be the same: the statute under which Turner was convicted includes a subjective intent
element.”).
169. The exact statement Turner wrote on his blog was: “If they are allowed to get away with
this by surviving, other Judges will act the same way. These Judges deserve to be made such an
example of as to send a message to the entire judiciary: Obey the Constitution or die.” Id. at 413.
He went on to state, “let me be the first to say this plainly: These Judges deserve to be killed.
Their blood will replenish the tree of liberty. A small price to pay to assure freedom for millions.”
Id. at 415. Additionally, he insinuated that they had been warned by a hit man and ignored the
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addresses of the judges, including detailed maps of the buildings that
indicated the locations of anti-truck bomb barriers.170 He vowed that
home addresses would follow.171 He was eventually convicted for mak-
ing “true threats.”172
While the defendant did not attempt to use the Black decision’s
possible subjective intent requirement as a defense, the court addressed
the controversy surrounding Black, sua sponte, in a footnote that com-
pletely dismissed the possibility of a subjective standard for the Second
Circuit.173 Acknowledging the disagreement between the other circuits,
the court noted that it had no occasion to address the potential subjective
standard proffered in Black.174 However, the court was willing to posit,
assuming arguendo a subjective intent standard was required, that that
would not have changed the outcome in the case because the defendant’s
blog was so egregiously threatening that it constituted a true threat pur-
suant to both objective and subjective tests.175 While the court went on
to rely on Watts and United States v. Davila (the Second Circuit decision
that adopted the objective speaker test), the court’s footnote discussing
Black seemed to indicate a future potential for change, as no court in the
Second Circuit has addressed whether a purely objective test is tenable
after Black.176
1. CASE STUDY: INTERNET THREATS IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
In United States v. Jeffries, the defendant made a YouTube video in
which he performed a self-written song expressing his grievances with
the judicial system, specifically the courts handling of a custody dispute
over his daughter.177 In the self-written lyrics, the defendant alluded to
his time in the military and threatened the judge’s life if the case was not
resolved favorably.178 After creating the YouTube video, the defendant
posted a link to his Facebook and sent the link to twenty-nine users,
including news stations and politicians.179 Within twenty-five hours, the
video was removed, but not before the defendant’s former-sister-in-law
warning. Id. at 413. The judges he threatened to kill were Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner,
both highly respected judges of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 416.
170. Id. at 415.
171. Id. However, it is not clear that these addresses were ever posted.
172. Id. at 422.
173. Id. at 420 n.4.
174. Id. at 420.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 420–21; United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 2006).
177. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 475–78 (6th Cir. 2012).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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had brought the video to the judge’s attention.180 This woman, who
alerted the authorities to the YouTube video, was not an intended recipi-
ent, as this individual was not a Facebook friend of the defendant.181
The defendant was prosecuted, and at his trial the jury was
instructed to apply an objective test, “in light of the context” from a
reasonable recipient’s perspective, and determine if the video constituted
a true threat or “a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily
injury . . . done to effect some change or achieve some goal through
intimidation.”182 Under this instruction, the defendant was convicted.183
The defendant appealed, contending that the jury instructions
directing the jurors to apply a purely objective test were no longer
appropriate after Black.184 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, finding that
Black did not create a subjective intent requirement but, instead, that the
Black Court merely interpreted a statute that required a subjective intent
inquiry and was not presented with the question of whether an objective
intent standard is constitutional. As such, according to the Sixth Circuit,
Black never reached the issue of intent.185 The Jeffries court, like in
other circuits, found much support for the objective test in Watts and
pre-Black precedent.186 Accordingly, the court applied a purely objective
test based on the perspective of the reasonable recipient, finding the
defendant’s statements to be “true threats.”187
While the Jeffries court was a unanimous decision with the major-
ity opinion written by Judge Sutton, paradoxically, two opinions were
issued.188 The second opinion was a dubitante opinion also authored by
Judge Sutton, casting doubt on his own opinion.189 In his dubitante opin-
ion, Sutton concluded that both the plain language definition of the word
“threat” and the legislative history for the statute in question indicated
that in order to communicate a threat, subjective intent is required.190
180. Id. at 477.
181. Jeffries Petition for Certiorari, supra note 31, at 17–20. R
182. Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 477.
183. Id. at 482.
184. Id. at 478–79.
185. Id. at 479. Judge Sutton stated, in his majority opinion, that the defendant’s interpretation
“reads too much into Black,” and then went on in his dubitante opinion to posit the same idea. Id.
at 483 (Sutton, J., dubitante).
186. Id. at 478–79.
187. Id. at 479–80.
188. Id. at 473.
189. Id. at 483 (Sutton, J., dubitante). A dubitante opinion is one that is rarely used, so I will
define it here. A dubitante opinion is one where “the judge doubted a legal point but was
unwilling to state that it was wrong.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (7th ed. 1999).
190. Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 484 (Sutton, J., dubitante) (“Conspicuously missing from any of
these dictionaries is an objective definition of a communicated ‘threat,’ one that asks only how a
reasonable observer would perceive the words. If words matter, I am hard pressed to understand
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Tracing the origins of the objective test, Sutton indicated that some
courts rooted their findings in criminal law of general intent as opposed
to specific intent crimes, and he reprimanded these courts for attempting
to change the fundamental meaning of the word threat.191
Rooting his opinion in Watts—not Black—Judge Sutton proceeded
to cast doubt on his own majority opinion, finding that the true and cor-
rect way to identify whether a statement can be proscribed as a criminal
threat is to apply both a subjective and objective test.192 In addition to
accepting the hybrid test, Sutton concluded his dubitante opinion by
explaining that despite the majority of circuits agreeing that the objec-
tive test is the correct test, the objective test was neither correct nor
consistent with any definition of the word “threat.”193 With this opinion,
the Sixth Circuit joined both the Second and Seventh in casting doubt on
the purely objective test.194
D. The Hybrid Test: Requiring Both Objective and Subjective Intent
Both the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit’s post-Black tests
require the precise standard that Judge Sutton advocated for in his dubi-
tante opinion.195 The hybrid test requires courts to assess both objective
and subjective elements.196 Under this test, the court must determine
whether the “defendant intended that the statement be understood as a
threat.”197 The Ninth Circuit periodically is aided by the addition of an
objective test, while the D.C. Circuit always requires the objective test
alongside the subjective test.198 In other words, in addition to determin-
ing the speaker’s intent, the court must also determine if “the statement
would be understood by people hearing or reading it in context as a
serious expression of an intent to kill or injure.”199 In United States v.
why these definitions do not resolve today’s case.”). As to Congress’ intent, Judge Sutton noted
that at no point did Congress believe that a person could be punished for communicating a threat
without subjectively intending to do so. Id.
191. Id. at 485. While this opinion is labeled a dubitante opinion, the language at times
indicates it may have been better classified as a dissent.
192. Id. at 485–86.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 130, 173, and 189. R
195. Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 483 (Sutton, J., dubitante); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d
1113, 1117 & n.14 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1,
1 (D.D.C. 2012).
196. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117 & n.14; In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F.
Supp. 2d at 1.
197. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1118.
198. See id. at 1117 & n.14; In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
199. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1118. This objective test is likely still a component because,
before Black, the Ninth Circuit debated adopting an objective test, but the subjective test
prevailed. United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying an objective
test). But see Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (questioning the inconsistency
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Twine, the Ninth Circuit hinted toward a subjective standard in dicta
when it expressed that in order for a statement to be considered a true
threat, “the level of culpability must exceed a mere transgression of an
objective standard of acceptable behavior.”200 After Black, the Ninth
Circuit solidified this subjective standard in United States v.
Bagdasarian, finding that the First Amendment requires a subjective
intent test to “be read into all threat statues that criminalize pure
speech.”201 While the Ninth Circuit adjusted its intent standard, it pre-
served the objective test’s elements and merely incorporated a further
subjective component.202 The court found the true threats definition in
Black to require the speaker to both intend to communicate and “intend
for his language to threaten the victim.”203
More recently, the D.C. Circuit addressed this issue as one of first
impression after Black.204 In dealing with none other than a social media
threat, the D.C. Circuit chose to follow the test proffered in the Ninth
Circuit’s United States v. Bagdasarian decision that incorporated both a
subjective and objective intent into one standard.205 The D.C. Circuit
was influenced by the unique characteristics of online communication in
combination with Black in departing from the majority of Circuits who
utilize purely objective tests.206
1. CASE STUDY: INTERNET THREATS IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
After Black, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v.
Bagdasarian, in which it found that threats against the President, made
on an online message board, did not rise to the level of a true threat
when the hybrid objective and subjective test was applied. During the
2008 presidential election, the defendant joined a Yahoo message board
between Romo and Cassel). But cf. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117 (reaffirming support for the
subjective test). However, an earlier case, Roy v. United States, decided within months of Watts,
continued to govern the requisite intent standard for the Ninth Circuit. Roy v. United States, 416
F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969). Roy applied a reasonable speaker test, assessing whether the reasonable
speaker would foresee that the recipient would interpret the statement as a threat. Id. at 877. This
held true through the much-cited decision, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc.
v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case, the court
emphasized the foreseeability element of the objective speaker test, finding that it was very
important to ensure that the threat was foreseeable given the context. Id. at 1075–76.
200. United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988).
201. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117.
202. Id. at 1116–17.
203. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005).
204. 652 F.3d at 1117; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1
(D.D.C. 2012).
205. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 2. This opinion noted that
like in Bagdasarian, there may be situations that call for only the subjective test, but it failed to
elaborate what those situations would be.
206. See supra note 95. R
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and posted disparaging comments about then-presidential candidate,
Barack Obama, indicating he would have a fifty-caliber bullet in his
head in the near future.207 The speaker also posted messages at the same
time about how drunk he was.208 The Secret Service was alerted and
interpreted the postings as threats.209 The Secret Service then found the
defendant at his home where he kept various weapons, including a fifty-
caliber rifle.210
The court explained that in assessing threats, both a subjective and
objective standard must be applied, not merely one of the two.211 The
court reasoned that because true threats are governed by the Constitu-
tion, “the subjective test set forth in Black must be read into all threat
statutes that criminalize pure speech . . . . [However,] with respect to
some threat statutes, we require that the purported threat meet an objec-
tive standard in addition, and for some we do not.”212 Therefore, the
court directed that the subjective test is mandatory in all instances after
Black where the question is a constitutional free speech issue involving
true threats, even if the test is inconsistent with prior tests.213
In this case, the court concluded that under the objective element of
the test, the statements could not be considered a threat by the reason-
able recipient because the recipient would have very little context with
which to interpret the statements posted on the message board.214 The
messages were anonymously posted on a financial board that was unre-
lated to the subject of the messages, and there was no evidence to sug-
gest the statements were not conditional.215 Moreover, the recipients had
no information regarding the fact that the defendant actually possessed
weapons.216 As support, the court relied on the fact that while many
people read the defendant’s postings, only one notified the authorities.217
In looking at the subjective element, the court held that the defen-
dant did not have the requisite subjective intent.218 The court reasoned
that the requisite intent was lacking particularly because the statements
were made in a predictive manner, with an exhortatory tone, and the
statements did not indicate that the defendant intended to carry out his
207. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1115.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1116.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1117.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1118.
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threats or have anyone else carry out the threats.219 As such, no subjec-
tive intent could be read into the defendant’s statements, and they did
not rise to the level of true threats.220
2. CASE STUDY: INTERNET THREATS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
The D.C. Circuit’s most recent true threats case was one of first
impression—it was the Circuit’s first opportunity to interpret the stan-
dard of intent for true threats following the Black decision.221 In this
case, the defendant utilized Twitter to express his desire to participate in
inappropriate sexual activities with Michelle Bachmann, United States
Congresswoman.222 The defendant challenged the court’s procurement
of his personal information from Twitter, contending that there was no
basis for the court to obtain his personal information under Black.223
Unlike the defendants in previous cases, here, the defendant contended
that Black advocated for an objective standard.224 He reasoned that
because the recipients on Twitter would not know his personal informa-
tion, it was not necessary for the jury to know it either to determine
whether his tweet could be considered a true threat under a reasonable
person standard.225 The court, however, was not persuaded and instead
concluded that a “close reading of Black raises doubts” about a purely
objective test.226
The court reasoned that because the Black Court found that the act
of burning a cross alone did not constitute a “true threat,” consequently
it was the subjective intent of the speaker to threaten that enabled burn-
ing a cross to become a “true threat.”227 The court reasoned that merely
assessing the threat’s objective effect was insufficient, instead opting to
consider if the tweet represented a “manifestation of a speaker’s ‘intent
of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death,’” or, more simply,
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1120–23.
221. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2012). There was
indication from his page that he frequently made sexually explicit jokes and meant this statement
in jest. Id. at 3.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 9.
224. Id.
225. Id. It is likely that this defendant was relying on the interpretation of the majority of
circuits, as explained above. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. R
226. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
227. Id. While it may be counterintuitive to imagine cross burning as not constituting a threat,
cross burning has sometimes been used without any threatening implications, indicating that the
context in which a cross is burned is key. One popular use of cross burning that was clearly not
meant to be a threat was that in Madonna’s Like a Prayer music video, where Madonna sang
while crosses burned in the background. See Madonna, Like a Prayer at 3:09 (Warner Brothers
Records 1989), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79fzeNUqQbQ.
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the “speaker’s state of mind.”228
Unlike other circuits, the D.C. Circuit determined that assessing the
“objective effectiveness” of the threat would be adding an additional
objective requirement to the subjective test, one that was not proffered
by Black.229 The court did not believe that Black wholly abrogated the
objective test, but instead that it added an additional element.230 There-
fore, the court adopted a subjective intent test, requiring “a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence,” while
noting some situations may require an objective standard in addition to
the subjective standard.231
The court then went on to consider if this particular tweet consti-
tuted a true threat.232 In reviewing the defendant’s entire Twitter
account, the court concluded that in light of the defendant’s entire
account, the tweet in question was not unusual because defendant’s past
tweets were “extremely crude” and in “incomprehensibly poor taste.”233
Furthermore, the court found that despite the crude nature of the tweets,
they were merely an “infantile attempt at humor” and not an actual
threat.234 The court correctly reasoned that while the tweets were offen-
sive, the tweets were merely vapid attempts at gaining attention from the
Internet that he “surely lack[ed] in real life” and were not true threats.235
The mere fact that the defendant’s tweets were not of any social
value did not authorize the court to limit them carte blanche.236 Instead,
the defendant’s tweet about his desire to sodomize Michelle Bachmann
was pure speech, and therefore not a “true threat.”237 The court sup-
ported its opinion noting that there was “nothing serious whatsoever”
about the defendant’s Twitter page “except . . . the severity of mental
depravity that would lead a person to produce such posts.”238 Further-
228. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (quoting Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 6–7 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360) (noting that the case at hand was not a
situation that required the objective test, but failing to clarify what situations would require it).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2.
234. Id. at 3.
235. Id. It is noted that at the time of the decision, the defendant had 736 followers subscribed
to see his tweets, and the court expected this number to grow after the decision was published. Id.
Two other tweets found on the defendant’s Twitter page that the court found to be vapid follow:
“My dick testified in court today in the case against my left hand ‘he beat me, your honor
everyday for 25 years[.]’” Id. Another example was, “Marcus Bachmann is sponsoring a
scavenger hunt in his home-town in the hopes someone finds his heterosexuality.” Id. at 4. To say
the least, the court was not amused with the defendant’s humor. See id. at 3–4.
236. See id. at 7–10.
237. See id. at 5–10.
238. Id. at 7.
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more, it was likely that a jury might find that the tweet was “political
hyperbole,” like in Watts.239 Therefore, the court concluded that the
threats did not rise to the level of true threats but instead were protected
speech under the First Amendment.240
IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE:
A CALL TO ABANDON THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD
“When some law-making bodies ‘get into grooves,’ Judge Learned
Hand used to say, ‘God save’ the poor soul tasked with ‘getting them
out.’”241
While it is clear that the circuits agree that the Supreme Court pre-
cedent set forth in Watts and Black indicates that context is very impor-
tant for the fact-finder when deciding whether a statement constitutes a
“true threat,” the courts disagree on the perspective from which this con-
text should be interpreted.242 Although the majority of circuit courts
apply a variation of the objective test, as noted in Part III, in a post-
Black world this may no longer be tenable—particularly with the
increased use of social media as a forum. As detailed throughout this
note, Internet speech is often anonymous, short, and lacking in context,
while the intent standard for true threats is ambiguous and inconsistent.
This section underscores why it is necessary for the Supreme Court to
provide a clear directive to the courts below to abandon the objective
standard altogether. Without a clear and uniform test, there is a high risk
that pure speech will be punished under criminal statutes inconsistent
with First Amendment principles.243 The combination of an increasing
number of true threat cases arising from Internet speech and the fact that
many circuits appear ready to abandon the objective test demonstrates
that the courts need to find a clear consensus on how to assess intent.
Therefore, it is imperative that the Supreme Court clarify Black, and that
it do so in more than 165 characters.244
A. Caught in the Grooves: The Objective Test in the Face of
Ubiquitous Online Communication
While all of the objective tests focus on different perspectives, the
underlying principle is the same: avoiding an inquiry into the subjective
239. Id. at 8 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
240. Id. at 7.
241. Jeffries v. United States, 692 F.3d 473, 486 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dubitante) (quoting
JUDGE LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 241–42 (2d ed. 1954)).
242. See supra Part III.
243. See Rothman, supra note 50, at 366. R
244. See supra Part III. The mention of 165 characters refers to the number of characters used
in Black to define true threats, a mere twenty-five more than are allowed in one tweet.
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state of mind of the speaker.245 The reality is that circuits utilizing a
purely objective test likely fear that by adding a subjective element, con-
victions for true threats will be harder to obtain and speech will be over-
protected.246 However, I would counter this supposition and suggest
that, in the face of the Internet, the opposite is true. Particularly when
assessing online speech, anonymous or not, difficulties arise in applying
the reasonable person test.247 Imagine the Bagdasarian case from the
Ninth Circuit, detailed above, where the anonymous speaker posted
threats to kill President Barack Obama on a financial message board.
The objective reasonable speaker could not possibly have expected peo-
ple to take his threats seriously. Why is this? The dominant reaction of
those who encounter anonymous threats is to treat the threats as innocu-
ous, just as the professional athletes and journalist from the introduction
of this note did.248
In fact, of all the people who got on this public message board, only
one reported the threats to the Secret Service.249 As the reasonable
speaker relies on the reasonable recipient to construe his speech, the fact
that the majority of recipients of the threat ignored it shows that, under a
reasonable recipient test, most threats sent over the Internet to public
forums would be construed as baseless and benign.250 Therefore, a
speaker would expect that even in the face of a tasteless or threatening
comment, that the recipients would either ignore it, or see it as an
attempt at humor, like in In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275.
Even assuming arguendo that the speaker subjectively intended his
posts to be a “true threat,” and that there were therapists and family
members ready to testify to the fact that he truly desired to threaten the
President, this information may not matter under an objective standard.
There is overwhelming evidence that the average reasonable recipient in
the context of anonymity would not report the threat or take it seriously,
and the subjective intent is not considered in purely objective jurisdic-
tions. The outcome of applying this test is, therefore, a general under-
protection of speech.
Applying the reasonable recipient test, the result would not be
much different. As noted above, most recipients would easily disregard
an anonymous, threatening message as inconsequential. In all but the
most serious of contexts, most users would presume that the speaker was
245. See supra Part III.
246. Segall, supra note 27, at 195–96. R
247. Caleb Mason, Framing Context, Anonymous Internet Speech, and Intent: New
Uncertainty About the Constitutional Test for True Threats, 41 SW. L. REV. 43, 73 (2011).
248. See supra Part I.
249. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011).
250. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. R
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one with a similar sense of humor like that in In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena No. 11116275; inappropriate, distasteful, and crude—but not dan-
gerous.251 As such, a reasonable juror, correctly applying the reasonable
recipient standard, would be hard pressed to convict someone who sent a
threat of this nature without some kind of overriding context. However,
this context could not be about the subjective intent of the speaker. For
example, in the In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275 case, had the
Twitter user attached a picture of himself, with a Vietnam era machete,
at a rally for the congresswoman, the reasonable recipient may see this
as a true threat. It is likely most recipients would only have this reaction
if the recipient could fathom the speaker actually getting close enough to
the threatened recipient to make his tweet a reality, which is unlikely
given the security that surrounds politicians.252 This may then require a
showing that the speaker actually had the ability to carry out the threat, a
standard clearly rejected by the Supreme Court.253 As such, it does not
appear that the reasonable recipient test would fare any better than the
reasonable speaker test in the context of Internet speech that often pro-
vides little clarifying context. Moreover, it is unlikely that a test that
could look at both, like in the Eleventh Circuit, would fare any better as
neither test provides an adequate basis for finding that a recipient would
feel threatened in anything other than the most extreme cases, leading to
a broad overprotection of speech.
Yet, it is not just anonymous speech where context is the key to
interpretation. Imagine, for example, that a couple fights and breaks up.
In the process of breaking up, they “un-friend” each other on Facebook,
presuming that this means they will no longer see each other’s Facebook
updates. Then, for this example, imagine the ex-girlfriend decides to
start dating again, has an unpleasant experience, and posts on her
Facebook a status about how much she hates men and could “kill a
man.” What she forgets is that while she “un-friended” her ex-boyfriend,
she did not “un-friend” all of his friends. So what happens next?
Just like in the Jeffries and Elonis cases, where a third party
revealed speech on a Facebook page to the threat’s recipient, here a
friend shares the status with the ex-boyfriend. The ex-boyfriend, who is
still mad about the breakup, gets angry, and decides to report the status,
which was not written about him, to the authorities. What happens when
the authorities not only charge the ex-girlfriend with making a threaten-
ing communication, under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), but also charge everyone
251. 846 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 8–12 (D.D.C. 2012).
252. Id.
253. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“The speaker need not actually intend to
carry out a threat.”).
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who “liked” the status as well? Without the subjective intent inquiry, a
jury will never learn that when this statement was originally made, it
was not about the person who felt threatened, nor did the speaker ever
believe it would be received by him. Is this really a true threat? How can
the objective tests thoroughly investigate this speech without considera-
tion of the subjective intent of the speaker not to direct this speech at the
recipient? This is particularly troubling where “private” and “direct”
communications are written and then shared later with third parties.
Moreover, many people use their social media pages as a way to
build support for their art, visual or otherwise.254 But, what happens if
one’s art could be construed as a threat—like in Elonis or Jeffries—
despite the person placing a disclaimer on their site that the page repre-
sents art? Would this grant the person more protection because there is a
warning to a “reasonable recipient” that the statuses are meant to be
therapeutic art and not actual threats?
For example, the rapper Eminem wrote a song titled “Kim,” where
he rapped about killing his ex-wife.255 How can the courts distinguish
Eminem’s rap lyrics about his wife from those in Elonis or Jeffries? It
would be reasonable to imagine that under purely objective standards,
the recipients, all ex-wives, would construe the lyrics similarly. How-
ever, it would be hard to imagine that a jury familiar with Eminem’s
songs would construe his lyrics as a threat. But, once fame is taken out
of the equation, and a jury is not familiar with the person’s artistic style,
the same jury may come to the exact opposite conclusion. So is all art
that includes what may be construed as a true threat potentially crimi-
nal? Possibly. Jurisdictions that apply a hybrid of the subjective intent
test and the objective test may provide more consistent results, because
juries will be given more context as to the speakers’ intentions, includ-
ing disclaimers on their pages and their past history, like in Bagdasarian
and In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275.256
B. The Hybrid Test: A Way Out of the Grooves
The objective test is ill-equipped to determine the intent of online
communications that often involve very little context. This is particu-
larly true where speech is largely ignored by the intended audience.
254. Robert Maynord, Artists and the New Normal, HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-maynord/artists-social-networking_b_1610290.html.
255. Andrew Dansby, Eminem’s Wife Sues for $10 Million, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 22, 2000),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/eminems-wife-sues-for-10-million-20000822.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (introducing
evidence that the speaker owned guns); In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp.
2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2012) (presenting evidence that the speaker’s Twitter account frequently featured
crass jokes).
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Accordingly, in the age of social media, the standard best equipped to
address threats is the standard proffered in the Seventh Circuit’s dicta in
United States v. Parr and in Justice Sutton’s dubitante opinion and
adopted by both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.257 This standard would ask
“the fact finder . . . first to determine whether a reasonable person, under
the circumstances, would interpret the speaker’s statement as a threat,
and second, whether the speaker intended it as a threat.”258 Not only
would this provide an avenue for consideration of evidence regarding
the speaker’s subjective intent and surrounding circumstances, like the
gun that the defendant in Bagdasarian owned, it would also ensure that
there was adequate breathing room for an artist who strives to become
the next Eminem, like in Elonis. Consequently, those who truly do not
intend to threaten another, yet do so unintentionally, would have an
opportunity to explain their intentions to the fact-finder.259
This approach is consistent with the longstanding First Amendment
precedent that strives to protect speech from being chilled.260 Whereas
the objective test for true threats presents a potential for underprotection
of speech, resulting in a potential chilling effect, the subjective test is
naturally congruent with the First Amendment’s goal to broadly protect
speech.261 Under the hybrid test, speakers are free to make jokes or post
rap lyrics on social media, even if tasteless, without worrying about
being prosecuted for speaking outside of acceptable social norms. As
such, I would posit that the hybrid test is not only the most consistent
with constitutional traditions of protecting pure speech from censorship,
but that it is also best equipped to deal with threats under the changing
landscape.
V. CONCLUSION
As Judge Sutton pointed out in his dubitante opinion, our jurispru-
dence has departed drastically from the plain meaning of a threat, so
much so that an objective reasonable person definition cannot be
squared with the word ‘threat’ itself.262 As a result, our courts are stuck
257. See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 486 (6th Cir. 2012); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 7; Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1119; United States v.
Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2008).
258. Parr, 545 F.3d at 500.
259. 652 F.3d at 1113. Without this standard, it would appear that the intent standard for a
threat would be based in negligence.
260. Sec’y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967–68 (1984)
(holding that statutes that create “an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech [are] properly subject
to facial attack”).
261. Segall, supra note 27, at 195–96. R
262. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Conspicuously missing from
any of these dictionaries is an objective definition of a communicated ‘threat,’ one that asks only
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in the grooves and need help to get out. As detailed above, the subjective
intent test is the rope dangling down, waiting for the other courts to grab
on and escape the grooves. Particularly, with the advances in the Internet
and social media, the purely objective test is no longer tenable, and there
is a need for a test that is better equipped to deal with the present land-
scape. The hybrid test fits the bill. However, even if the courts do not
choose to adopt the hybrid test, with the limited agreement amongst the
circuit courts after Black, there is a need for clarity—the many iterations
of intent required for a true threat after Black prevent justice from being
served equally across the nation. At issue is one of our founding fathers’
deeply cherished rights, the freedom of speech, and thus a need for clar-
ity is clear as, currently, Internet speech that falls outside generally
acceptable norms, even if posted in jest, is susceptible to criminal pun-
ishment. As a result, without clear guidance, it is likely that pure speech
will be stifled under the current objective test. This would result in an
outcome that is contradictory to this nation’s history and tradition of
expansive protection of free speech.
how a reasonable observer would perceive the words. If words matter, I am hard pressed to
understand why these definitions do not resolve today’s case.”).
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